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the rationale of the Interstate Commerce Commission is preferable,
from a pragmatic viewpoint, to any other alternative. Less harm
is likely to result from the deliberate misapplication of an obscure
statute than would flow from the further extension of the overworked commerce clause typified in such cases as Chance v. Lambeth,
or from granting the federal courts the power to oversee private
action under the guise of the fourteenth amendment, as was suggested in the Whiteside case.
STEPHEN C. Mc:A.LEY

LEVY AND ATTACHMENT OF CORPORATE STOCK
Fifty shares of A. T. & T. stock are not difficult things to talk
about so long as no one asks where they might be found. At the behest of plaintiffs whose defendants cannot be brought into court,
diligent sheriffs have performed various rituals of levy and attachment of stock. Assured that a decorated piece of parchment bearing
numbers and a couple of fine but illegible signatures is the crystallization of all the defendant's valuable ownership in a given corporation, not a few officers of execution have later been disappointed to
find that what they seized was only a dim reflection of the defendant's interest, insusceptible of seizure or worthless at sale.
This discussion contains an attempt to categorize the various
frustrations awaiting attempts to attach or levy on shares of corporate
ownership; for this purpose no distinction need be made between
levy and attachment., Primary emphasis is placed upon the statutory
law of the states; and individual cases are discussed only to illustrate
the alternatives before a court that must evaluate, in terms of dollars,
the method used by a sheriff to seize a person's stock.
It is now of only academic interest that at common law shares of
ownership in a corporation were regarded as stuff too incorporeal
for a sheriff to lay hands on. This century was young when all states
had statutes that specifically subjected shares to seizure. These statiPomerance, The "Situs' of Stock, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 43, 62 (1931): "[T]he two
problems lend themselves to treatment as one, because jurisdiction over property
is acquired only when it is within the control of the state, and is subject to
seizure."
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utes uniformly declared that the sheriff might effectively take corporate ownership into his possession by service of the appropriate writ
upon some officer of the corporation involved. In more parochial
times a corporation was identified with its state of incorporation, and
with that state only; thus the stock of a foreign corporation could not
be seized on the bare statutory authority granted the forum to assume
jurisdiction over stock in domestic corporations.2 In 1850 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rebuffed an attempt to levy on the certificates
of a Mississippi corporation:

3

"This stock is held and transferrable according to the law of
its creation, the statute of Mississippi, on the books of the
bank only . .

.

. It will hardly be contended, that lands in

Mississippi could be attached, because the owner had sent on to
this city his title-deed with power, to a broker to sell the
same and raise money; yet, there is, in fact, no difference ...
Bank-stock is made subject to levy and attachment, recently,
by our statutes; but, then, it is bank-stock of our own state,
subject to our own laws, and transferrable by a judicial sale
under them; and not British, or French bank-stock, or the
bank-stock of any other state ....
"
It is apparent that some distinction had to be made between
shares and certificates of shares. The certificates might be anywhere,
but the shares remained on the books of the corporation. The certificates were "the evidence of things not seen," 4 and even in the hands
of an innocent purchaser they were representative of nothing at all
until recognized on the transfer books of the corporation. Thus an
attaching creditor whose seizure preceded the recordation of the
2Beale, The Exercise of JurisdictionIn Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27
HARV. L. REv. 107, 110 (1913): "The courts .. .almost unanimously hold that the
presence of a certificate of stock within the jurisdiction gives no power to take
the right evidenced by the certificate; existing only on the books of the corporation, it can be attached only in that place where the corporation books legally
exist, that is,
at the domicil of the corporation."
3Christmas v. Biddle, 13 Pa. (1 Harris) 222, 223 (1850).
4
State v. Davis, 85 Ohio St. 43, 56, 96 N.E. 1022, 1024 (1911): "The certificates
are the mere attestation of the stockholder's ownership of the shares. The certificates are no more actual property than a man's deed is his farm. They are no more
than an admission on the part of the corporation that the person to whom they
were issued has, pro tanto, performed his part of the contract in becoming a stockholder."
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transfer on the books of the corporation prevailed over the innocent
purchaser notwithstanding the latter's purchase of the certificates
long before the seizure was made.

Tr UNIFORM STocK TRANSFER Acr
At the turn of the century commercial necessity began to peck
away at these results. Aside from new theorems of conflict of laws
that enabled the forum to exercise jurisdiction over shares in foreign
corporations - these will be discussed later in this note - legislatures and courts went about the task of changing the character of
stock certificates in domestic corporations. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act, experimented with in the 1890's, was approved by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1909.5 Its effect was to give
certificates elements of negotiability for purposes of transfer. Sections 1 and 5 of the act 6 made the holder of the certificate the presumptive owner of the share; section 13, consistent with the basic
7
theory of the act, provided:
"No attachment or levy upon shares of stock for which a
certificate is outstanding shall be valid until such certificate
be actually seized by the officer making the attachment or levy,
or be surrendered to the corporation which issued it, or its
transfer by the holder be enjoined."
The obvious purpose of section 13 was and is to foreclose the possibility that a good faith purchaser of the certificate, relying on sections 1 and 5, will be defeated by his transferor's creditor, who
"seized" the shares by some method inconsistent with the idea of
complete embodiment of the share in the certificate. The USTA has
56 U.L.A. 7 (1922).

OSec. 1 provides that "title to a certificate and to the shares represented thereby
can be transferred only, (a) By delivery of the certificate indorsed either in blank
or to a specified person .... or (b) By delivery of the certificate and a separate
document containing a written assignment of the certificate or a power of attorney
" See
- FLA. STAT. §614.03 (1)(a), (b) (1955). Sec. 5 provides: "The delivery of
a certificate to transfer title in accordance with the provisions of section 1, is
effectual ... though made by one having no right of possession and having no
authority from the owner of the certificate or from the person purporting to transfer the title." See FLA. STAT. §614.07 (1955).
76 U.L.A. 17 (1922).
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now been adopted in all states; the sections of the act that make the
certificate the crystallization of the share as between conflicting purchasers have been uniformly enacted in the manner suggested by the
Commissioners. The enactment of section 13, however, is anything
but uniform; many states have rejected in whole or in part the method
of seizure prescribed by it. Since the law of a state other than the
forum is often controlling in the evaluation of a particular levy or
attachment, it is necessary to consider the provisions of all the
states that are likely to have an interest in the question.
For the purposes of this note the states have been distributed into
four categories, determined by the manner in which the various
legislatures have ordered the seizure of stock interests: "certificate"
states, "notice" states, "dual method" states, and "uncommitted"
states.
Certificate States
The twenty-three certificate jurisdictions are those in which section 13 has been enacted as suggested by the Commissioners or reworded in a manner that does not affect the basic proposition that
in order to seize a share of stock the sheriff must actually seize the
certificate.' In these states no other method of levy or attachment is
suggested by the statutes; the conflicting provisions for attachment by
notice to a corporate officer have been expressly repealed and removed from the official statutes or they have been so qualified as to
make attachment impossible except by seizure of the certificate in
addition to notice.
Notice States
The legislatures of eight states, including that of Florida, have
8ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §60 (1940); Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §10-243 (1956);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §5199 (1949); D.C. CODE ANN. §28-2913 (1951); ILL. ANN. STAT.
c. 32, §428 (Smith-Hurd 1954); IND. ANN. STAT. §25-713 (1948); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. §274.130 (1955); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §12.536 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art.
23, §108 (1951); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §19.343 (1937); MINN. STAT. §302.14 (1953);
NEv. COMP. LAWS §1854.12 (Supp. 1949); N.J. STAT. ANN. §14-8-39 (1939); N.Y.
Pets. Prop. Law §174; ORE. REV. STAT. §58.130 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A,
§8-317 (1954); S.D. CODE §11.0513 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §48-1016 (1955);
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1358-13 (1945); UTAH CODE ANN. §16-3-13 (1953);
VA. CODE ANN. §13.1-413 (Supp. 1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. §3065 (1955); Wis.
STAT. §183.125 (1955).
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rejected in its entirety the import of section 13 of the USTA. 9 In
these states the concept of seizure of the certificate is conspicuously
absent from the provisions of their otherwise uniform acts; moreover, it has not been embodied in their procedural laws, which authorize levy and attachment only by notice to a corporate officer.
DualMethod States
Five states have statutes that conclusively indicate that either
method - notice or seizure of certificate - can effectively be used
to attach or levy upon a stockholder's interest.10 In these statutes
the section corresponding to section 13 either sets out the alternative
method or refers specifically to the notice method compiled under
the procedural portions of the official statutes.
Uncommitted States
Most of the thirteen uncommitted states"1 would be classified as
certificate states were it not for the fact that the compiled statutes of
each do not omit the old sections relating to attachment by notice to
the corporation. In each of these states section 13 contains the suggested phrase "no attachment or levy . . . shall be valid until such
certificate be actually seized," but the old provisions were not expressly
repealed upon the enactment of the USTA. There are several argu-

ments for the proposition that the old sections are without validity
despite their continuation in the official statutes: by its terms section
OCAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§2450-86 (Deering 1953); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 41, §99
(1935); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§181-202 (1953); FLA. STAT. c. 614 (1955); GA. CODE
ANN. c. 22-19 (Supp. 1955); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 155, §§24-46 (1948); NEB. REv.
STAT. §25-1520 (1943); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§294.53-.75 (1955).
i0KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§17-4813, 60-911, 60-3410 (1949); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§403.170 (1952); MONT. Rlv. CODES ANN. §§15-640, 93-4307 (4), 93-5810 (1947); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §1.97 (1953); VT. STAT. §5818 (1947).
-1ARK. STAT. ANN. §§64-313, 31-111 to 31-116 (1947); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§30-413,
8-505, 8-506 (4) (1948); IOWA CODE §§493A.13, 639.22 (1954); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
c. 53, §63, c. 112, §28 (1954); MISs. CODE ANN. §5359-12 (Supp. 1954), §1907 (1956);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § §51-5-13, 26-1-38, 26-1-39 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-87 (Supp.
1955), §55-145 (1950), §§1-458, 1-459 (1943); N.D. REv. CODE §§10-1813, 32-0810 (4)
(1943); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§1705.16, 2715.11 (Page 1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
c. 118, §13, c. 547, §14 (1938); S.C. CODE §§12-318, 10-922, 10-925 (1952); WASH.
REv. CODE §23.20.140 (1951), §7.12.130(3) (1956); Wyo. Comip. STAT. ANN. §§44-513,
3-4403 (1945).
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13 is exclusive; the old provisions are impliedly repealed by the enactment of an inconsistent method; the USTA itself contains a clause
repealing all inconsistent legislation. (The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws list Ohio as the only one of the thirteen uncommitted
states that failed to enact the repealing clause in the original session
laws, but only Idaho and Mississippi have embodied the repealing
clause in their official statutes.)
At first blush the argument is convincing that section 13 and
the repealing section effectively exclude the possibility of statutory
levy or attachment by service of a writ on a corporate officer. Yet
2
it has been held otherwise. In Hodes v. Hodes1
the stockholder asserted to the Oregon court:
"[Slince the adoption of the uniform law the situs of the stock
is that of the certificate representing it, and that inasmuch
as the certificates here in question are not in Oregon, the stock
is not in this state and therefore is not liable to execution."
In this case the judgment creditor sought to levy on the stockholder's
shares although the certificates were located in a Washington safety
deposit box. The corporation was created in Oregon, and the stockholder was personally before the court. At the time of the suit Oregon
had adopted section 13 as well as the repealing provision, but had
retained authorization in the official statutes for levy by service of
the writ on a corporate officer. 13 The court said: 14
"[T]he shares of stock owned by the judgment debtor may
be attached or levied on by the sheriff leaving a certified copy
of the writ of attachment, or execution, as the case may be,
with the proper officer of the respective corporations . . . and
by an order of court enjoining the holder of the certificates
from transferring them."
The second phase of the remedy granted by the court -that of enjoining the stockholder -is specifically authorized by section 13 as
a means of attachment for jurisdictional purposes and levy for execution purposes. This, however, does not affect the fact that the
12176 Ore. 102, 106, 155 P.2d 564, 566 (1945).
13ORE. COMp. LAws ANN. §7-206 (3) (1940).
14176 Ore. 102, 109, 155 P.2d 564, 567 (1945).
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Oregon court deemed the old statute to be not inconsistent with and
hence not repealed by section 13. Subsequent to the decision in
the Hodes case, the Oregon legislature amended the old notice statute to require compliance with section 13.15
CONFLIcrs PROBLEMS
The shady distinctions between certificates and shares are compounded when they are made for the purpose of deciding what law,
between states with dissimilar statutes, should determine the character of the certificate and the efficacy of a seizure. The classic rule
that the situs of the share is the state that gave it being has remained
essentially intact. Thus, by conventional conflicts rules, the law of
the state of incorporation determines whether the certificate embodies
the share for purposes of foreign levy and attachment. 16 The conflicts problems attending the attachment of corporate stock at the
forum are most meaningful when viewed in three variable situations:
only the certificate is present at the forum; only the corporation is
present at the forum; only the stockholder is present at the forum.
Certificateat Forum
Section 13 operates at its optimum when neither the corporation
nor the stockholder is domiciled at the forum but the certificate is
susceptible to seizure there. Theoretically, the coincidence of the
state of incorporation as well as the forum being a certificate state
must occur before the certificate can be seized. The state of incorporation defines the certificate as embodying the share; the forum
authorizes its sheriffs to seize certificates for jurisdictional purposes
and to sell them for execution purposes.
Most courts have denied the validity of a certificate seizure, even
IsSee ORE. REv. STAT. §29.170 (3) (1955).
leSee Ctammr, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK §66 (2d ed. 1940); GOORICH, CONFUCT
OF LAws 174-75 (3d ed. 1949). REsTATEmEmNT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §53 (1934) provides:
"(1) Shares in a corporation are subject to the jurisdiction of the state
in which the corporation was incorporated.
"(2) The share certificate is subject to the jurisdiction of the state within
whose territory it is.
"(3) To the extent to which the law of the state in which the corporation
was incorporated embodies the share in the certificate, the share is subject to
the jurisdiction of the state which has jurisdiction over the certificate."
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though authorized by local law, if the certificate was not given the
attributes of the share by the incorporating state." Conversely, it
would not seem reasonable for a notice state court to seize any certificate, regardless of the law of the state of incorporation. It could
hardly be argued that the sheriffs of Florida are empowered by the
law of New Jersey to levy upon certificates of New Jersey corporations
by a method not authorized by the laws of Florida.
The Uniform Act by its own terms is applicable only to shares of
domestic corporations and those organized under the laws of states
whose laws are "consistent with this act." 18 The Michigan court in

Haughey v. Haughey9 seized upon this qualifying clause and attached a debtor's certificates of stock in a Maine corporation. Although at the time of attachment Maine had not adopted the USTA,
it did have an isolated statute making stock transferable by delivery
of the certificate.2 0 The court reasoned that Maine therefore had law
"consistent with" that of Michigan, a certificate state. This theory
can be criticized on a rather weighty doctrinal ground: Maine was
a notice state and quite obviously did not honor attachment in Maine
of certificates of stock in its own corporations.21
The New York court has not even bothered to show the consistency
demonstrated by the Michigan court, simply holding that any stock
certificate found in the state may be seized. In Simpson v. Jersey City
Contracting Co. it was held, without the slightest reference to the
law of the incorporating state, that a nonresident's certificates of
stock in a New Jersey corporation might be attached in the hands of
22
the stockholder's pledgee in New York:
"The defendant had, to the extent of its ability, transferred
to the trust company, as security for the payment of its indebtedness, whatever was its interest in the foreign corporation as
evidenced by the delivery of the certificates of stock. Did it
17The

leading case is Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A.2d 152 (1939), in which

the Pennsylvania court, sitting in a certificate state, held that the certificates of
stock in a Virginia corporation- created by a certificate state- could be attached
in Pennsylvania but that certificates of a Delaware (notice state) corporation could
not. See Annot., 122 A.L.R. 338 (1939), for collected cases.
1SSection 22, 6 U.L.A. 25 (1922).

19305 Mich. 356, 9 N.W.2d 575 (1943).
20ME. REV. STAT. c. 56, §43 (1930).
2
1ME. REV. STAT. C. 95, §28 (1930)

provided for seizure of corporate stock by

service of the appropriate writ on an officer of the corporation.
22165

N.Y. 193, 197, 58 N.E. 896, 898 (1900).
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not, therefore, dearly, have property rights, or interests, within
this state, which could be impounded by our courts to abide
the result of the litigation over the plaintiff's daim? I think
so. The distinctions sought to be drawn are, largely, artificial.
The truth is that it did have property here, in the common acceptation of the term, as well as in the eye of the law."
Although orthodox conflicts doctrines clash with the results reached
in the Haughey and Simpson cases, there is a respectable argument
that the cases are sound. Notwithstanding the fact that a notice state
does not incorporate shares in the certificate for purposes of attachment, all states have, by enacting the basic provisions of the USTA,
23
incorporated shares in the certificates for the purpose of transfer.
If the courts of the corporation's domicile will not honor, a transfer
that takes place without delivery of the certificate, who is prejudiced
by the creditor's attachment of the shareholder's certificate in a
certificate state? Certainly a stockholder's transferee who did not insist on delivery of the certificate should not be heard to complain.
But what of other creditors who attach under the law of the state
of incorporation by ignoring the certificate and giving notice to the
corporation? The New York court in the Simpson case took the leap
24
of faith on this score:
"It is not that our courts could effectuate a transfer of the
stock upon the books of the foreign corporation; but that the
corporation itself will recognize and give effect to the [execution] purchaser's title."
Proceeding on this policy of magnificent assurance - which is the
best it could do for New York's judgment creditors under the circumstances - the court eventually found itself in the inevitable situation
of assuring a certificate-attaching creditor of his title,25 only to watch
the Delaware court, sitting in a notice state, award the same interest
to a creditor who subsequently attached the share by notice to the
corporation.2 6 A doctrinal explanation of the Delaware creditor's
2
success has been advanced: 7
23Sections 1, 5; FLA. STAT. §§614.03 (1) (a),.07 (1955).
24165 N.Y. 193, 200, 58 N.E. 896, 899 (1900).
2 Cotnareanu v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 271 N.Y. 294, 2 N.E.2d 664 (1936).
28Woods v. Spoturno, 7 Harr. 295, 183 At. 319 (Del. Super. Ct. 1936).
27Note, 85 PA. L. Rlv.522, 526 (1937).
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"[T]he apparent conflict between the Delaware and New York
attachments . . . is necessarily resolved in favor of the Dela-

ware attachment, for that proceeding subjected the shares
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, whereas the New
York attachment conferred upon the court jurisdiction of the
certificate only, the exercise of which jurisdiction could affect the share merely by indirection."
This fairly states the result in terms of the certificate-share distinction; Delaware did not embody the share in the certificate for the
purpose of attachment. Realistically, however, the reason why the
conflict was resolved in favor of the Delaware attachment was that
the Delaware court said this was the way it should be resolved. The
question was, which execution purchaser should the Delaware corporation recognize as the new stockholder? Considering the comparative strengths of the Delaware and New York courts under these
circumstances to force compliance with their respective orders, the
question was rhetorical.
The presence of a certificate in an unreconstructed notice state is,
of course, of no use to an attaching creditor. Under other circumstances these are the creditor's prospects. If the state of incorporation
is a certificate state, attachment of the certificate at the forum will
protect him completely. If the state of incorporation is a dual method
state, immediate compliance with the perfecting provisions of the
appropriate statute will probably save his bacon.28 If the incorporating state is a notice state but the forum can otherwise find "consistency" with its own statute, levy or attachment of the certificate and
execution at the forum may prevail over subsequent transferees and
the debtor-stockholder who assert their rights at the situs of the shares.
The certificate-attaching creditor, however, will not prevail against
another creditor who attaches the share on the books of the corpora2SState ex tel. North American Co. v. Koerner, 357 Mo. 908, 211 S.W.2d 698,

appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 803 (1948), in which the Missouri court held that under
that state's dual method statute a stockholder's interest in a domestic corporation
could be attached by notice to the officers even though the certificates were in
New York. It has been suggested that the court's dictum concerning "situs" in
Missouri, uttered to justify attachment there, forecloses the possibility of "situs"
in New York or in any state in which the certificates rest. Note, 1951 WASH.
U.L.Q. 384, 394. If this observation is accurate, which seems doubtful, it sterilizes
the provisions of the dual method states as well as those of the uncommitted states
that eventually will become dual method states.
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tion and records his ownership first. If the forum's educated calculations cannot place the situs of the shares certainly in either the certificate state or the dual method state category, the forum's execution purchaser should act as if the incorporating state were a dual
method state.
Corporationat Forum
To courts sitting in states uncommitted to the exclusive method
of certificate seizure an important question is whether the corporation
whose stock is sought to be seized is within the state for jurisdictional
purposes. The problem is only academic in those states whose laws
enable the sheriff to seize the share by seizure of the certificate alone.
This, of course, is the sole method prescribed by section 13; and it
is the probable reason why the legislatures rejecting section 13 did
so. 2 1 Domestic corporations are doubtless within the state for jurisdictional purposes, but to enact section 13 and repeal the notice
statutes prevents the courts of the corporate situs from perfecting jurisdiction by attachment if the debtor-stockholder or the certificate is
not present in the state. 30
On the doctrinal level there seems to be nothing amiss in a holding that a foreign corporation may be within the state for purposes
of attachment by notice to a corporate officer. 31 The conclusion follows from unquestioned holdings that a foreign corporation by doing
business in the state submits to the jurisdiction for purposes of suits
against it. The subtle extension of this "presence" theory to levy and
attachment cases conceals a major policy decision that is, at best,
questionable. In an ordinary claim against a foreign corporation the
primary question is whether it should be made to pay its way for
business done in the state. On the other hand, when a court in a
notice state, dual method state, or uncommitted state holds that a
foreign corporation is within the state for the purpose of attaching
2
9See
3

State ex rel. North American Co. v. Koerner, supra note 28.
oSee Amm v. Amm, 117 N.J. Eq. 185, 175 At. 186 (Ch. 1934); Bloch-Daneman
Co. v. J. Mandelker & Son, Inc., 205 Wis. 641, 238 N.W. 831 (1981); see also
Pomerance, The "Situs" of Stock, 17 CoRNFj.L L.Q. 43, 65 (1981), in which the
author evaluates §13 as "re-enacting the common law rule that the state of incorporation has power to attach, but adding, as a condition precedent to attachment, the seizure of the certificate or an injunction against its transfer."
. 3'See Parks-Cramer Co. v. Southern Express Co., 185 N.C. 428, 117 S.E. 505

(1923).
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the share of a nonresident stockholder by notice to a corporate officer,
the court has affected the rights of persons who neither know nor particularly care about the business of the corporation in the state of the
forum. In this event, the corporate domiciliary state's law concerning seizure of stock is irrelevant, because the forum attaches the stock
by a method applicable to its own domestic corporations.
Assuming that the domiciliary state will willingly enforce corporate recognition of foreign attachments thus obtained when the
debtor-stockholder is the only loser, what is to become of the claims
of third parties? These include creditors who attach the certificate
in any certificate state, if the domiciliary state incorporates the share
in the certificate; who, in any state other than a certificate state,
attach the share by giving notice to an officer of the corporation, if it
is doing business in that state; or who attach the share in the domiciliary state if it is a notice, dual method, or uncommitted state.
What of a purchaser for value of the certificate itself? Priorities of
claims probably will eventually have to be resolved by the courts of
the domiciliary state, which admittedly has primary jurisdiction over
its own corporate creature. The right combination of events could
place the court of the domiciliary state in the interesting position of
deciding which of two adverse attaching creditors, each of whom
attached the share by the notice provisions of different sister states,
should have priority to a share that could not be attached at home
except by seizure of the certificate!
These problems are not so academic as they might appear to be
on casual perusal. Official corporate domiciles have a way of being
paper domiciles only, and it would be tempting indeed to a court
in a de facto domicile of a foreign corporation to hold that the forum's
notice provisions are applicable in the seizure of the corporation's
32
stock.
In all states whose legislatures have enacted the theory of section
13, with or without an alternative method of notice to the corporation, a short inroad on the basic idea of the chattelized certificate
exists: "No attachment or levy upon shares of stock for which a certificate is outstanding shall be valid until . . . its transfer by the

holder be enjoined." The import of this method of obtaining juris32See Smith v. Pilot Mining Co., 47 Mo. App. 409 (1891).
a nonresident, the forum was a notice state, and the foreign
stantially all of its business in the state of the forum. Like
statutes, the Missouri provision did not specifically apply to
yet the court held that it did apply.
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diction and satisfying judgments will be discussed in more detail
infra. At this point, however, it should be noted that section 13 does
not authorize a court to perfect its jurisdiction by compelling a domestic corporation to turn over stock to the sheriff for the benefit
of an attaching creditor. 33 It speaks only of injunctions against the
holder. This is important only in certificate states, since in other
states there are other ways of attaching stock in the offices of domestic corporations.
Stockholder at Forum
Section 13, in authorizing attachment by enjoining the holder
from transferring the certificate, provides a useful compromise between compulsory attachment of the certificate and disregard of the
certificate. As a departure from the dominant theory of the USTA,
this provision can be criticized because it allows a court to attach a
resident's share in a foreign corporation without taking the certificate
out of commercial circulation; but this is one of those cases in which
consistency comes at a high price. Added, it seems, as an afterthought
to a unified system that otherwise consistently regards the certificate
as the share, it attests to the Commissioners' recognition that a stock
certificate is an easy thing to hide in an old shoe or send out of the
state. Yet enjoining a stockholder to desist from transferring the
34
share cannot be said to be totally ineffective:
"It is urged... that there is no efficiency in an injunction
restraining the transfer of stock when not actually seized.
To this it may be said that this is a matter for the legislature
to determine; and it evidently thought a restraining order had
some deterring effect. It is not for courts to question such a
conclusion. On the contrary, it is generally conceded from long
judicial experience that an injunction is an efficient remedy in
aid of justice."
No good reason appears why the forum cannot apply its own
law to justify enjoining the holder from marketing his share. If
33See Levy v. Gittelson, 324 Mich. 242, 37 N.W.2d 105 (1949); Elgart v. Mintz,
123 N.J. Eq. 404, 197 At. 747 (Ch. 1938). But cf. Crane v. Crane, 373 Pa. 1, 95
A.2d 199 (1953).
34Harbridge v. American Nat'l Bank, 177 Wis. 206, 209, 187 N.V. 853, 854 (1922).
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the forum is a notice state that has no provision for the use of the
injunction for this purpose, the question, of course, is moot. But
no conflicts doctrine requires the forum to look to the law of the
state of incorporation to determine what its rights are to manage the
stockholder's conduct with respect to the share.
Whether the injunction will be an effective remedy for the attaching creditor is indeed an important question.3 Unless the debtorstockholder can be compelled to produce the certificate, it theoretically
still may be bought by a good faith purchaser. If the state of incorporation has embodied the share in the certificate, it may still
be attached in another certificate state; if the corporate domiciliary
state is a notice state, the share still may be seized there. One of
the primary purposes of the USTA is to foreclose suits to determine
priorities between innocents with conflicting claims. Since two certificate states can produce conflicting claims if one of them enjoins
the holder, the act by its own terms fails in this respect. Yet, considering the host of inevitable conflicts that occur because the act
is not of uniform operation throughout the country, the few additional disappointed litigants who are created by the injunction clause
do not engender much alarm.
SUGGESTED FLORIDA LEGISLATION

It should appear at this point that the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act exists only in the eyes of the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. The multitudinous sins of half the legislatures in the country
still travel under this name, to be sure, but for all practical purposes
the title is a misnomer for the purposes of levy and attachment of
shares. There is no uniformity on this subject, and there is likely to
be none in the foreseeable future. Since Florida, a notice state, presumably has already examined its conscience with respect to upsetting
the uniformity of section 13, we might assume that the legislature
would have no general objection to recasting the statutes to give
Florida creditors and stockholders the utmost protection for their
money.
At present Florida is in the unenviable position of being a notice
state with a statute that subjects the shares of domestic corporations
35See Wright, Protection of Creditors Under the Proposed Florida Business
Corporation Act, 6 MIAMI L.Q. 192 (1952), in which the author expresses his displeasure with §13.
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only to levy and attachment. 36 This means that Florida creditors cannot seize corporate stock of foreign corporations, regardless of whether they do business in Florida.3 7 The Florida Court has no statutory interstice, as do some courts, to fill with a holding that our
notice statute applies to foreign as well as domestic corporations. 38
The dual method states have comprehensive pieces of legislation
that should be considered by Florida legislators. Oklahoma's provisions are particularly elaborate. Drafted by Dr. Floyd A. Wright3 9
of the University of Miami, the series of eight sections provide essentially that:

40

(1) Any outstanding certificate of stock in any corporation,
domestic or foreign, may be seized for levy or attachment
purposes within the state. The certificate thus seized is
sold as any other personal property would be sold.
(2) If it is "impossible or inconvenient" to seize the certificate
within the state, the share may be attached by notice to
an officer of the corporation. This remedy is available
if the corporation is domestic or if it is a "domesticated"
foreign corporation that has a principal part of its property and assets within the state.
s6FsA. STAT. §614.15 (1955), the section that corresponds to §13 in location,
as now proprovides that "shares of stock may be attached or levied upon ....
vided by law" and seems to do nothing more than keep the section numbering
orderly. The sections referred to are FLA. STAT. §§55.25-.31 (1955). The first and
key section of this series provides: "Shares of stock in any corporation incorporated
by the laws of this state shall be subject to levy of attachments and executions,
and to sale under executions on judgments or decrees of any court in this state."
(Emphasis added.)
37But cf. Bronson v. Willis, 142 Fla. 64, 194 So. 245 (1940), in which the
Florida Court held the stock of the First National Bank of Kissimmee subject to
levy. In Brightwell v. First Nat'l Bank, 109 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1940), the same
result was reached by a federal court. These decisions are as distinguishable as
they are reasonable: they involve the stock of a corporation organized by an act
of Congress and operated with its officers and books in Florida.
3sSince Florida's "Uniform Stock Transfer Law" was made applicable "to
transfers made in this state whether of certificates for shares of domestic or foreign
corporations," FLA. STAT. §614.24 (1955), there is some room for argument that
the section authorizing levy and attachment "as now provided by law" impliedly
repeals the italicized limitation of the old section quoted in note 36 supra. It
seems unlikely, however, that this argument will gain many adherents.
3oDr. Wright was on the faculty of the University of Oklahoma College of Law
at the time the Oklahoma Business Corporation Act was drafted.
40OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§1.96-.103 (1953).
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(3) Upon levy or attachment by notice to the corporation, the
corporation is obliged to give written notice of the proceedings to the record holder. One year after the sheriff's
service of notice the share may be sold at execution.
Most of these provisions are self-explanatory. It should be noted,
however, that a one-year period of suspended animation is imposed
upon the creditor when he attaches by notice to the corporation. This,
obviously, is done for the protection of innocent purchasers of the
certificate. If within one year of the notice a certificate purchaser
asserts a claim of ownership that was perfected by delivery of the
certificate before the levy or attachment was made, the purchaser wins
and the creditor must look elsewhere for property with which to
satisfy his judgment. At least there is no innocent execution purchaser to be injured. On the other hand, if the certificate purchaser
is tardy in his application to the corporation for a change of ownership on the books, or if he bought the certificate after the seizure on
the books was made, he has purchased nothing more than a piece of
paper. The draftsman of the Oklahoma act asserts that "the only
burden it places on anyone is that it requires a purchaser of shares
evidenced by a certificate issued over a year prior to contact the corporation to find out if the shares have been levied upon through the
' '41
corporation before he consummates the purchase.
Of course these provisions tend to retard the free movement accomplished by section 13's basic theory of negotiability. The Oklahoma method has been rakingly, albeit inaccurately, criticized for
this retardation. 42 There is no room, however, for criticism in Flor41Wright, supra note 35, at 206.
42See Vliet, The Oklahoma Business Corporation Act, II, A Survey, 2 OKLA. L.
RFv. 177, 209 (1949). After pointing out that an innocent certificate purchaser
would, under the act, be defeated if he failed to surrender the certificate to the
corporation for transfer until after the execution sale, the author wrote: "Is he,
as a bona fide purchaser for value, to be defeated in his claim of ownership?
Obviously so, under the language of the Act! And therein lies the fatal weakness
...which the Uniform Stock Transfer Act was designed to avoid .... The Act
should be amended to eliminate the provisions thereof providing for attachment or
levy on shares through the corporation and to reaffirm the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act . . . as adopted in every other state of the union ....

." (Emphasis added.)

It can hardly be said that every other state in the union is committed only to §13
of the USTA. There is, however, room for question on another important point.
The Oklahoma provisions are aimed toward helping the levying creditor. What
about the creditor who seeks to attach the stock for purposes of in rem or quasi
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ida on this point; if the dual method partially restricts negotiability,
the notice method authorized in Florida for domestic corporate stock
completely cripples it.
The draftsman of the Oklahoma Business Corporation Act, in
which these provisions are contained, has made a prodigious but
rather fruitless attempt to sell the same ideas to Florida legislators.
Provisions for levy and attachment of corporate stock identical to
those enacted in Oklahoma were part of the voluminous Florida
Business Corporation Act that was introduced with singular lack of
success to the 1951 Legislature. 3
Shares of ownership in corporations have always been ephemeral
things. Attempts to define corporate ownership abstractly usually
manage to confound all who listen, but they accomplish little else.
Nowhere is the mystery more profound than in the problem of
seizure of that ownership for the benefit of creditors of the owner.
Since the purposes of the Uniform Act, to assure negotiability and to
eliminate conflict of laws problems, have met with frustration, there
seems to be no reason why Florida should not enter the fray with
better weapons than it now has in its statutory arsenal.
ROBERT P. SMITH, JR.

in rem jurisdiction? In these cases seizure of the share is the basis of the court's
power to act; if one year must elapse before it can be determined whether anything
of value was attached, must the lawsuit be suspended during the interval?
43lntroduced as H.B. 883 on May 4, 1951, by Rep. Okell of Dade County.
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